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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FOREIGN 
CONTRACTORS: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WORKER 
SAFETY ABROAD 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the many ways in which globalization has radically altered the way 
people live is through how people work. As technology has enabled companies 
to globalize, manufacturing jobs seeking low-wage labor have been migrating 
to developing countries. Along with lower wages, workers in developing 
countries also face substandard working conditions, including forced labor and 
dangerous work environments. Since the 1980s, public opinion, particularly in 
western countries, has pushed companies producing goods abroad to ensure that 
their workers are not mistreated.1 This impetus provided by customers, 
shareholders, and the community at large has developed into a new concept—
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”). CSR encourages companies to 
implement corporate policies not only to protect workers’ rights, but also to 
prevent environmental damage and to contribute to the improvement of society 
in general.2 In response, some companies have adopted policies to integrate CSR 
into their corporate practices. In addition, governments and international 
organizations have recognized the importance of CSR not only in official 
statements and reports, but also in the implementation of legislation to enforce 
some measure of CSR. However, legal repercussions are limited against 
companies that have their goods produced by foreign contractors, which often 
have poor working conditions. This Paper aims to review the current methods 
used by various countries to hold such companies responsible and to consider 
possible legal alternatives for the United States. 
This Paper begins by reviewing the effect of globalization on labor and the 
development of CSR. Next, the history of American labor law is discussed to 
demonstrate the legislation resulting from decades of concern regarding worker 
safety. The review extends to international standards in regards to workers’ 
rights and worker safety. Next, this Paper discusses the existing legal approaches 
to worker safety and CSR both in the United States and around the world. In the 
last section, the existing and potential legal approaches in the United States to 
hold companies accountable for labor rights violations of their foreign 
 
 1. Firuza S. Madrakhimova, Evolution of the Concept and Definition of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, GLOBAL CONF. BUS. & FIN. PROCS., May 2013, at 113, 113. 
 2. What Is CSR?, U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG., http://www.unido.org/csr/o72054.html 
[https://perma.cc/22C6-A7V8]. 
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contractors are analyzed. Finally, this Paper gives a recommendation as to how 
the United States can implement CSR in the American legal system. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Impact of Globalization 
Since the 1970s, the process of globalization has led to greater economic, 
social, and cultural interconnectedness around the world.3 The social, political, 
and legal implications of globalization significantly impact people around the 
world and the human rights they are accorded.4 Prompted by trade liberalization 
and cheaper and easier transportation, companies routinely operate in different 
parts of the world.5 In particular, business operations and supply chains now 
expand across multiple continents.6 Companies have moved parts of their 
business to countries with cheaper labor, fewer labor and environmental 
requirements, and lower taxes in order to increase profits and competitivity.7 
Since the rise of globalization, multinational corporations have become 
powerful players in the international sphere.8 In fact, some corporations are 
larger than the economies of some countries.9 The growing importance of 
corporations in the world means that corporations often have a role in the 
enjoyment of human rights. This is especially relevant in developing countries 
where many multinational corporations have brought their operations involving 
manufacturing, assembly, services, and have even developed new markets.10 
 
 3. Andrea Scozzaro, Labor Standards in International Law: All States Should Have an 
Obligation to Punish Misconducts of Multinational Enterprises Under International Customary 
Law, 19 CUNY L. REV. 59, 62 (2016), http://www.cunylawreview.org/labour-standards-%E2%80 
%A8in-international-law-all-states-should-have-an-obligation-to-punish-misconducts-of-multina 
tional-enterprises-under-international-customary-law/ [https://perma.cc/FU4S-BK66]. 
 4. Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France’s Nouvelles 
Régulations Économiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 441, 441 (2004). 
 5. Martín Rama, Globalization and Workers in Developing Countries 7 (World Bank Dev. 
Research Grp., Working Paper No. 2958, Jan. 2003). 
 6. M. Eric Johnson, Supply Chain Management: Technology, Globalization, and Policy at a 
Crossroads, 36 INTERFACES 191, 191 (2006). 
 7. Marié McGregor, Globalization and Decent Work (Part 1), 14 JUTA’S BUS. L. 150, 150 
(2006). 
 8. Claudia T. Salazar, Applying International Human Rights Norms in the United States: 
Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable in the United States for International Human 
Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 111, 156 
(2004); see also John Spanier, Who Are the “Non-State Actors”?, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43, 50 (William C. Olson ed., 8th ed. 1991). 
 9. Erin Foley Smith, Right to Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non Conveniens: 
Opening U.S. Courts to Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 145, 149 (2010). 
 10. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 14 (2011), https://www.o 
ecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TL2-2RNP]. 
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In particular, globalization has created a significant change in employment. 
Because skilled labor is more prevalent in developed countries and less so in 
developing countries, unskilled employment opportunities increasingly have 
migrated to developing countries.11 Between 1970 and 1997, the developing 
world’s share in manufacturing exports increased from twenty-three percent to 
thirty-eight percent of the total amount of manufacturing exports.12 This trend 
has both positive and negative effects. The growth of employment opportunities 
in the developing world can have a significant impact on poverty levels.13 The 
availability of industrial jobs is a contributing factor to poverty reduction; 
poverty is more closely tied to rural agricultural jobs.14 Additionally, women 
have been able to take advantage of these opportunities and increase their 
earnings.15 Furthermore, foreign companies generally comply with domestic 
and international labor standards to a greater degree than their domestic 
counterparts.16 While lower working standards in developing countries are a 
problem, provisions in the law promoting workers’ rights can reduce the cost of 
globalization for workers in developing countries.17 
The outsourcing of unskilled labor, however, also has significant negative 
effects. While women are able to make an income, they are usually employed 
because they are paid less than men and are less likely to become involved in 
trade unions.18 Furthermore, the growth of unskilled labor opportunities in the 
developing world is associated with child labor.19 In 2013, the U.S. Department 
of Labor found 122 goods, including coffee, cotton, shoes, carpets, and furniture, 
that were believed to have involved child labor.20 Labor violations due to 
globalized outsourcing disproportionately affect women, children, minority 
populations, and indigenous peoples.21  
 
 11. Rama, supra note 5, at 7. 
 12. Roger Blanpain, The Globalisation of Labour Standards: The Soft Track Law, 14 TILBURG 
L. REV. 10, 11 (2007). 
 13. Rama, supra note 5, at 16. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 15. 
 16. Cael Warren & Raymond Robertson, Globalization, Wages, and Working Conditions: A 
Case Study of Cambodian Garment Factories (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 257, June 
2011). 
 17. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-861 E, NAFTA LABOR SIDE 
AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATE 15 (2001). 
 18. Rama, supra note 5, at 15. 
 19. Id. at 16. 
 20. KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN 
SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE 1 (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ 
sb657/resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6Z8-ABTC]. 
 21. S.L. Bachman, The Political Economy of Child Labor and Its Impacts on International 
Business, 35 BUS. ECON. 30, 31, 35, 38 (2000); John McKenzie, The Limits of Off-Shoring—Why 
the United States Should Keep Enforcement of Human Rights Standards “In-House,” 83 IND. L.J. 
1121, 1132–33 (2008). 
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In 2005, the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) expressed its concern 
about the winner-take-all mentality pervasive in the process of globalization.22 
A major concern regarding globalization and employment is the “race to the 
bottom” theory about working standards.23 In order to encourage corporations 
to operate in their countries, some governments will tolerate poorer working 
conditions.24 Furthermore, the laws of many countries do not govern corporate 
behavior abroad,25 so corporations often operate with “virtual impunity” for its 
human rights obligations outside its countries’ borders. Sweatshops often have 
ten-to-twelve hour workdays, compulsory overtime, unsafe working conditions, 
punishment, locked doors, low pay, abuse, and prevention from organizing.26 
One example is Foxconn, a Chinese company that produces electronics for 
Apple, Nokia, and Sony, as well as other companies.27 Foxconn employees often 
work 100-hour workweeks in unsafe working conditions.28 The lack of 
adherence to reasonable labor standards has significant negative effects on 
society, dampening productivity and instilling a cycle of poverty by depriving 
children workers of their education.29 However, if companies can improve the 
poor working conditions in their businesses abroad, or those of the contractors 
they hire abroad, workers will benefit from the higher wages that globalizing 
companies can provide.30 Some economists argue that imposing workers’ rights 
in developing countries would decrease economic growth in those countries.31 
Others insist that, due to the ease of business relocation, sufficient labor 
standards need to be imposed in developing countries.32 
B. Corporate Social Responsibility 
While globalization may result in worse labor standards, globalization has 
also prompted people in developed countries to raise their expectations for 
corporations and the corporations’ influence on the economy, society, and 
environment.33 In response to campaigns against child labor, forced labor, and 
dangerous working conditions, companies began developing internal codes of 
 
 22. McGregor, supra note 7, at 152. 
 23. Scozzaro, supra note 3, at 61. 
 24. Id.; McKenzie, supra note 21, at 1138; Smith, supra note 9, at 150. 
 25. McKenzie, supra note 21, at 1138. 
 26. Scozzaro, supra note 3, at 62. 
 27. Id. at 63. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Blanpain, supra note 12, at 17. 
 30. McGregor, supra note 7, at 151. 
 31. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97–861 E, NAFTA LABOR SIDE 
AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATE 2 (2001). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, DOC/01/19 (July 18, 2001) [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
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conduct.34 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Levi Strauss & Company and 
Reebok Corporation were forerunners, reviewing human rights instruments to 
craft their codes of conduct.35 Furthermore, they demanded that the codes of 
conduct be applied to their global supply chain, including their suppliers.36 Their 
codes of conduct involved monitoring and enforcement provisions, including 
surprise audits and company reviews.37 Since these early codes of conduct, the 
concept of CSR has continued to grow, the pressure by civil society and the 
media has intensified, and expectations have risen.38 Some corporations have 
exceeded expectations to ensure CSR in their actions abroad and recognized 
their ability to improve the lives of their workers abroad. In 2013, for example, 
Kate Spade & Company launched their “on purpose” initiative, which involved 
the creation and development of an independent supplier in Rwanda to be run as 
a “social enterprise.”39 Although Kate Spade provided the financial means to 
create the company, the company is owned by the employees, artisans who make 
Kate Spade products.40 The supplier pays its artisans a living wage, offers 
twenty-one days paid vacation, provides a clean work environment, and 
schedules an eight-to-five workday with stretch breaks and a one-hour lunch 
break.41 So far, Kate Spade’s independent supplier has been able to net a profit, 
with expectations for a greater margin in the coming years, while enabling 
workers to improve their quality of life.42 As the concept of CSR gains popular 
support worldwide, corporations are increasingly responding by implementing 
efforts to ensure that their operations—and those of their suppliers—are socially 
responsible. 
CSR is “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”43 Stakeholders are people who affect or are 
affected by the company in question, including customers, suppliers, 
shareholders, financiers, employees, and the local community.44 CSR involves 
four layers: economic responsibility to be profitable, legal responsibility to obey 
 
 34. Lance Compa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, 30 COMP. LABOR L. 
& POLICY J. 1, 3 (2008). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 4; Scozzaro, supra note 3, at 63. 
 38. Compa, supra note 34, at 5. 
 39. EDWARD SOULE, CATHERINE TINSLEY & PIETRA RIVOLI, A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LINK IN 
A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN: PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF A NEW SUPPLIER MODEL 7–8 
(2017) (first emphasis omitted), http://womensleadershipinstitute.georgetown.domains/on-pur 
pose-kate-spade/ [https://perma.cc/HP6Q-GZ5D]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 11. 
 42. Id. at 52. 
 43. Green Paper, supra note 33. 
 44. Id. 
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the law, ethical responsibility to act justly and fairly, and philanthropic 
responsibility to be a good corporate citizen and improve quality of life.45 
Importantly, studies have demonstrated that companies that internalize CSR 
principles can boost performance and profits.46 While companies often receive 
negative publicity for ignoring CSR, they develop a more productive workforce 
and attract positive attention for complying with CSR principles.47  
Civil society, governments, and corporations themselves continuously 
encourage the growth of CSR.48 In 2001, the European Union published a Green 
Paper about promoting CSR in Europe.49 The Green Paper discussed both how 
European countries had already begun to promulgate CSR, and how the 
European countries should promote CSR not only within the European Union 
but also worldwide.50 The European Union countries are obliged to ensure that 
labor standards are sufficient to promote its development policy.51 The Green 
Paper underscored the importance of laws and binding rules in promoting 
CSR.52  
In addition, many non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) have 
developed techniques to hold corporations publicly accountable. For example, 
the nonprofit organization, B Corporation, certifies companies that achieve 
rigorous social and environmental standards. This certification encourages 
companies to compete to be the best for society.53 B Corporation also aims to 
change the definition of success in business to include social improvement.54 
Another NGO is Social Accountability International, which established the 
SA8000 Standard for decent workplaces.55 Corporations must meet the 
numerous requirements under the standards in order to become SA8000 
certified.56 Other NGOs, including the Fair Labor Association, Worker Rights 
Consortium, Ethical Trading Initiative, Clean Clothes Campaign, Worldwide 
 
 45. Andreas Thrasyvoulou, Corporate Social Responsibility: Here to Stay, 4 LEGAL ISSUES J. 
69, 74 (2016). 
 46. Green Paper, supra note 33. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., About Fair Trade USA, FAIR TRADE USA (2017), http://fairtradeusa.org/about-
fair-trade-usa [https://perma.cc/LC2H-KBFJ]. 
 49. Green Paper, supra note 33. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Why B Corps Matter, B CORPORATION (emphasis omitted), https://www.bcorporation.net/ 
what-are-b-corps/why-b-corps-matter [https://perma.cc/W95L-LX6X]. 
 54. What Are B Corps?, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps 
[https://perma.cc/7T6V-XFLR]. 
 55. About SAI, SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, http://www.saintl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
Page.ViewPage&pageId=472 [https://perma.cc/F9PC-UCH6]. 
 56. SA8000 Standard, SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuse 
action=Page.ViewPage&PageID=937 [https://perma.cc/TN99-EUNK]. 
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Responsible Apparel Production, and movements such as fair trade certification, 
reflect continuously growing support for CSR.57 
The implementation of CSR has provided some benefits, but relying on 
corporations to self-regulate has proven to have limited effect. In 2001, Nike and 
Reebok, together with workers’ rights organizations, exerted pressure on their 
South Korean-owned sportswear supplier to accomplish a democratic workers’ 
union at the factory in Mexico.58 However, the reliance on companies and their 
corporate codes to enforce labor standards can lead to varied applications of 
labor standards.59 CSR often works in conjunction with public pressure, which 
is limited due to the sporadic nature of media attention.60 
C. The Rise of Independent Contractor Labor 
The process of globalization itself evolves, and the current trend has seen 
multinational enterprises increasingly rely on foreign contractors to source and 
produce their goods.61 The use of contractors has removed health and safety 
working standards from under the legal purview of developed countries.62 CSR 
has contributed in this area, as some corporations have obliged their contractors 
and suppliers to conform to corporate codes of conduct.63 However, using 
contractors has also allowed corporations to deny responsibility and avoid 
liability for abuses of workers’ rights.64 The application of corporate codes of 
conduct on contractors and suppliers relies on implementation and subsequent 
verification by the corporations.65 Therefore, CSR alone is not sufficient to 
ensure that corporations and the contractors involved in their supply chain and 
production respect workers’ human rights and provide adequate working 
conditions.66 
 
 57. Compa, supra note 34, at 5. 
 58. Id. at 1. 
 59. Aaron K. Chatterji & Siona Listokin, A Comment on “Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Workers’ Rights,” 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 11, 13 (2008). 
 60. McKenzie, supra note 21, at 1138. 
 61. Green Paper, supra note 33. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Philipp Wesche & Miriam Saage-Maaß, Holding Companies Liable for Human Rights 
Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers Before German Civil Courts: Lessons from 
Jabir and Others v KiK, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 370, 370–71 (2016); Compa, supra note 34, at 7. 
 65. Green Paper, supra note 33. 
 66. Compa, supra note 34, at 6. 
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II.  LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Historical Development of Labor Law in the United States 
In the United States, the occupational hazards facing industrial workers 
became a public concern during the nineteenth century, when reports about 
health effects on workers were delivered to Congress.67 The first statute 
regarding worker safety was passed in Massachusetts in 1877, setting an 
example subsequently followed by other states.68 Initially these laws intended 
to compensate workers who were victims of industrial accidents.69 Legal 
theories of contributory negligence and assumption of risk often shielded 
employers from liability.70 In the early 1900s, however, states began passing 
laws assigning liability to employers.71 
Federal legislation to protect workers appeared later. The first legislation 
requiring safety equipment for railroad cars and engines was passed in 1893.72 
In 1916, Congress passed a child labor law, which was later declared 
unconstitutional.73 In 1936, Congress passed the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts 
Act,74 a weak attempt to set work safety standards as well as limit working 
hours.75 The Fair Labor Standards Act76 (“FLSA”) was passed in 1938.77 Until 
1970, Congress enacted piecemeal legislation to combat worker safety problems 
in specific industries.78 Congress developed federal legislation setting health and 
safety standards by passing the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
(“OSHA”).79 
B. FLSA 
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to combat the rampant poverty among 
the working class in the wake of the Great Depression.80 The FLSA intended to 
ensure an adequate standard of living and to prevent competition among 
businesses from resulting in the perpetuation of poor labor conditions.81 The law 
 
 67. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 2 (2016). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 2. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. 41 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6511 (2012). 
 75. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 3. 
 76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 77. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 3. 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 4. 
 80. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Fair Labor 
Standards Act—Supreme Court Cases, 196 A.L.R. Fed. 507 (2004). 
 81. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 100 (1941); Wooster, supra note 80, at 507. 
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set minimum wage requirements and mandated overtime compensation for 
hourly workers.82 The FLSA has provisions prohibiting the use of child labor in 
commerce and the production of goods.83 
C. OSHA 
Congress began contemplating more comprehensive worker safety 
legislation in 1970.84 At the time, estimates assessed that every year 14,500 
people were killed in industrial accidents, and 2.2 million workers became 
disabled while on the job.85 Furthermore, nearly 400,000 new cases of work-
based illness were reported annually.86 Many states, however, had insufficient 
safety regulations and enforcement.87 In response, Congress passed OSHA. The 
law not only sets a uniform standard for workplace safety across the nation, but 
also permits states to introduce legislation to set higher standards.88 OSHA 
regulations apply in all states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and all U.S. 
territories.89 Employers are required to ensure that the workers’ area does not 
have any hazards recognized by OSHA as likely to cause serious harm or 
death.90 OSHA standards require that all working areas be kept clean and 
sanitary.91 Furthermore, emergency action plans for fires, chemical spills, and 
inclement weather are obligated to be formed and disseminated.92 Safety 
equipment is required to protect workers from the effects of noise exposure, 
hazardous chemicals, and dangerous machines.93 OSHA compliance officers 
enforce the regulations through inspections.94 
III.  WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
The United Nations published the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (“Guiding Principles”) in 2011.95 The Guiding Principles are to 
 
 82. Wooster, supra note 80, at 507. 
 83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 212(a), 212(c) (2012). 
 84. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 4. 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2. 
 88. Id. at 65. 
 89. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 8. 
 90. Id. at 8–9. 
 91. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.22(a)(1) (2017). 
 92. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.38(a)–(b). 
 93. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(a), 1910.132(a), 1910.212(a)(1)–(2). 
 94. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 9. 
 95. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at iv (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinci 
plesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JMA-TWGH]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
518 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:509 
be interpreted so as to accomplish “tangible results” for the people affected by 
business practices and to promote sustainable development.96 The United 
Nations urges countries to encourage businesses to respect human rights through 
corporate and securities law.97 Countries should act in order to meet their 
international human rights obligations by ensuring that businesses likewise 
respect human rights.98 The relevant human rights that countries should consider 
in legislating for businesses are instilled in the International Bill of Human 
Rights and the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work and Its Follow-Up.99 In their operations, businesses should refrain from 
committing human rights violations and mitigate violations that are related to 
their operations.100 The United Nations describes the application of the Guiding 
Principles as an evolving process, as risks to human rights change over time with 
changes to the business.101 Where a business works with another entity that 
violates human rights, the business should work to mitigate the impact of the 
violation, or, if possible, end the business relationship.102 Businesses can avoid 
legal repercussions where their actions demonstrate complicity with human 
rights violations by practicing due diligence to prevent such violations.103  
B. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
In 1998, the ILO established four unassailable principles in the Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up.104 The four 
fundamental principles are: 
(a) [F]reedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.105 
 
 96. Id. at 1. 
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. at 13. 
 100. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, supra note 95, at 14–16. 
 101. Id. at 17–18. 
 102. Id. at 21–22. 
 103. Id. at 18–19. 
 104. ILO, ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK AND ITS 
FOLLOW-UP 1 (1998), http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—en/in 
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/X7GP-4JFW]. 
 105. Id. at 7. 
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The ILO recognized that these principles are crucial to maintain social 
progress in conjunction with economic growth.106 While these principles are 
enshrined in ILO Conventions and therefore binding for countries that ratified 
the documents, the ILO insists that ILO members that have not ratified are still 
required to respect and promote these principles.107 
C. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”) was 
negotiated as a complementary document to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”).108 The goal of the NAALC was to improve livelihoods 
and labor standards in NAFTA countries.109 While the NAALC does not force 
any extra laws on the countries, it obligates them to enforce already existing 
workers’ rights.110 Among the principles that the NAALC requires are the 
prohibition on forced labor, overtime compensation rights, minimum wage, 
compensation for occupational injuries, prevention of occupational injuries, and 
labor protection for children.111 Compliance is governed by the NAALC 
Council, which receives and responds to complaints regarding failure to 
comply.112 However, the enforcement mechanisms are limited, as sanctions are 
available for violations of only three of the eleven principles, and countries are 
otherwise expected to self-enforce.113 The development of the NAALC has 
prompted cross-border communication and greater harmonization of labor 
standards measurements to permit easier comparison of productivity and 
wages.114 
 
 106. Id. at 5. 
 107. Id. at 2. 
 108. BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT 
ON LABOR COOPERATION: A GUIDE (2005), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalcgd. 
htm#NAALC [https://perma.cc/68YZ-9VCK]. 
 109. BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, SUBMISSIONS UNDER THE NORTH 
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION (NAALC), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/ 
agreements/naalc.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y5X-JMFL]. 
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IV.  EXISTING LEGAL APPROACHES 
A. Summary of Legal Approaches to Ensure CSR 
1. Denmark 
In 2000, the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs introduced the Social Index 
to measure the social responsibility of companies.115 Company management and 
employee representatives meet and assess employee conditions, training, sick 
leave, dismissals, health and safety, and social responsibility of suppliers and 
customers.116 The assessment results in a score (0–100), which is useful for 
determining future improvement.117 A company achieves the right to use the “S-
label” on its products for three years if the score is above sixty and is certified 
by an independent auditor.118 In addition, the Danish Ministry of Economics and 
Business Affairs created the CSR Compass in 2005 to help small and midsize 
companies determine their CSR in their global supply chain.119 
2. United Kingdom 
The U.K. Parliament introduced the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to force 
companies to disclose the extent of their efforts to ensure that their supply chains 
do not involve slavery.120 Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, businesses 
carrying on in the United Kingdom with annual turnover of £36 million or 
greater are required to make a statement disclosing the steps the business took 
to ascertain that no slavery was involved in its business or its supply chain.121 
The purpose of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is to make clear which businesses 
are doing “the right thing” by ensuring that they do not profit from slavery, and 
which businesses do not.122 The government believes that such transparency will 
serve to prevent slavery in business supply chains.123 A business that qualifies 
under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and fails to make the required statement 
could be subject to an injunction and, in failing to comply with the injunction, 
be held in contempt and accordingly receive an unlimited fine.124 Consumers are 
 
 115. JOSEPH M. LOZANO ET AL., GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
PUBLIC POLICIES BEYOND REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 76 (2008). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. LOZANO ET AL., supra note 115, at 77; The Parties Behind the Initiative, CSR COMPASS, 
http://www.csrcompass.com/parties-behind-initiative [https://perma.cc/V52E-RWVP]. 
 120. United Kingdom Modern Slavery Act 2015, § 1, 42 (Eng.). 
 121. AMBER RUDD, TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ETC. A PRACTICAL GUIDE 5, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/649906/Transpar 
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to play a role in the Modern Slavery Act 2015’s goals by deciding with their 
buying power whether or not the steps taken by a business are sufficient.125 
3. India 
By passing the Companies Act 2013,126 the Parliament of India became the 
first country to require companies to take part in CSR.127 The Companies Act 
2013 obligates certain companies to include a Corporate Social Responsibility 
Committee Board with at least three directors.128 The purpose of the committee 
is to promulgate CSR policies, such as poverty amelioration, education, health, 
environment, gender equality, and vocational skills, and the company must 
spend at least two percent of average net profits toward the policies.129 If the 
company fails to spend the required two percent of profits toward accomplishing 
the CSR policies, then the Board must disclose the reasons for this failure.130 
4. California 
In 2012, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 came 
into effect.131 Under the law, retailers and manufacturers that do business in 
California per their California tax returns and have annual gross receipts of over 
$100 million are required to disclose the company’s efforts (or non-efforts) to 
verify that human trafficking and slavery are not part of their supply chain.132 
Companies must make clear and concise disclosures on their websites.133 The 
business must disclose the degree to which the business conducts evaluations 
concerning human trafficking and slavery, and the extent to which it is verified 
by a third-party auditor.134 In addition, the disclosure must detail how the 
business audits suppliers for compliance with the business’s standards and 
whether or not the audit was independent.135 Direct suppliers must certify that 
the products used were in accordance with the laws of the countries in which the 
suppliers do business.136 Furthermore, the disclosure must include the 
procedures for contractors and employees that do not meet its standards.137 
Lastly, the business must disclose the extent to which management and 
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 126. Companies Act, 2013, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013). 
 127. Thrasyvoulou, supra note 45, at 81–82. 
 128. Id. at 82. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012). 
 132. HARRIS, supra note 20, at i. 
 133. Id. at ii. 
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employees receive training regarding human trafficking and slavery, especially 
in the context of supply chain.138 The California Franchise Tax Board is 
responsible for determining which companies are subject to the California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act.139 The attorney general has the authority to 
enforce California Transparency in Supply Chains Act by filing for injunctive 
relief.140 The intent of the law is to give California consumers the requisite 
information to allow them to combat human trafficking and slavery through their 
purchase power.141  
5. France 
In early 2015, a bill was introduced in the French legislature regarding the 
duty of care of companies.142 The bill proposed a law requiring large companies 
to establish a “vigilance plan” instituting measures to prevent risks to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, serious physical injury, environmental 
damage, and health hazards from the operations of the company, its subsidiaries, 
and its contractors.143 The National Assembly adopted the text for the proposed 
law the following month.144 The Senate rejected the bill in its first review.145 
The following year, the National Assembly modified parts of the law and passed 
it to the Senate for a second review.146 The Senate added its own modifications 
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 139. Id. at 3. 
 140. Id. at 4. 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. Proposition de loi 2578 du 11 février 2017 proposition de loi relative au devoir de 
vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Proposal for law 2578 of 
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http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion2578.asp [https://perma.cc/4THE-JENW]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Texte adopté 501 du 30 mars 2015 proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des 
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Adopted Text 501 of March 30, 2015 on the 
Proposal of Law for the Duty of Due Diligence of Parent Companies and Main Contractors], 
ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], Mar. 30, 2015 (Fr.), http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0501.asp [https://perma.cc/NF3F-DZLV]. 
 145. Texte adopté 40 du 18 novembre 2015 proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance 
des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Adopted Text 40 of November 18, 2015 
on the Proposal of Law for the Duty of Due Diligence of Parent Companies and Main Contractors], 
SÉNAT [SENATE], Nov. 18, 2015 (Fr.), http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas15-040.html [https://perma.cc/77 
8H-YNP9]. 
 146. Texte adopté 708 du 23 mars 2016 proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des 
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Adopted Text 708 of March 23, 2016 on the 
Proposal of Law for the Duty of Due Diligence of Parent Companies and Main Contractors], 
ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], Mar. 23, 2016 (Fr.), http://www.assemblee-na 
tionale.fr/14/ta/ta0708.asp [https://perma.cc/SCQ5-558V]. 
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in its second review.147 The National Assembly largely rejected the Senate’s 
modifications and proffered a version that was summarily rejected by the 
Senate.148 The National Assembly adopted the definitive text of the law on 
February 21, 2017 to be enacted after a constitutionality review.149 The 
Constitutional Council found some provisions of the law to be 
unconstitutional.150 
The final version of the law on the duty of care of parent companies 
provides: 
The law applies to: 
(1) Companies that, after two consecutive financial years, employ at least 5000 
employees in its head office and in its direct or indirect subsidiaries with its 
registered office in France, and 
(2) Companies that employ at least 10,000 employees in the parent company 
and in its direct or indirect subsidiaries with its registered office in France or 
abroad. 
Requirements for companies to which the law applies: 
(1) Establish and implement an effective vigilance plan. The plan shall include 
reasonable vigilance measures to identify risks and prevent serious 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the health and 
safety of persons and the environment resulting from the activities of society 
and those of the companies it controls directly or indirectly, as well as the 
activities of subcontractors or suppliers with whom an established 
 
 147. Texte adopté 1 du 13 octobre 2016 proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des 
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[SENATE], Feb. 1, 2017 (Fr.), http://www.senat.fr/leg/tas16-074.html [https://perma.cc/23LX-
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ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], Nov. 29, 2016 (Fr.), http://www.assemblee-na 
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 149. Texte adopté 924 du 21 février 2017 proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des 
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Adopted Text 924 of February 11, 2007 on 
the Proposal of Law for the Duty of Due Diligence of Parent Companies and Main Contractors], 
ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], Feb. 21, 2017 (Fr.), http://www.assemblee-na 
tionale.fr/14/ta/ta0924.asp [https://perma.cc/WQ2P-FCJX]. 
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Light, ECOVADIS (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.ecovadis.com/blog/duty-care-law-french-constitu 
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commercial relationship is maintained, where these activities are related to 
that relationship. 
(2) The vigilance plan shall include: 
a. A mapping of risks, intended for their identification, analysis, and 
ranking; 
b. Procedures for the regular assessment of the situation of subsidiaries, 
subcontractors, or suppliers with whom an established commercial 
relationship is maintained with regard to risk mapping; 
c. Actions to mitigate risks or prevent serious harm; 
d. A mechanism for alerting and collecting alerts on the existence or the 
realization of risks;  
e. A mechanism for monitoring the measures implemented and evaluating 
their effectiveness. 
(3) The vigilance plan shall be made public. 
Enforcement procedures: 
(1) The Council of State can supplement the requirements of the vigilance plan. 
(2) A court of competent jurisdiction and the president of the court can force 
companies to comply and establish a vigilance plan. 
(3) For any harm caused by a failure to comply with the duties of this law, a 
company is obliged to make good on the harm that the execution of the law 
would have prevented. Any person justifying an interest can bring a cause 
of action against the company. The court can order the company to comply 
with its decision.151 
The viability of the law is heavily debated. Detractors argue that the law 
applies to very few companies, many of which have already instituted these 
policies, and is too vague in its terminology.152 Furthermore, opponents of the 
law point out that companies already suffer significant harm in failing to police 
their supply chains, as they suffer reputational, financial, operational, and 
national and international civil and criminal penalties.153 They insist that a 
 
 151. The author translated and paraphrased this passage from the following sources: Loi 2017-
399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
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GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/3/27/2017-
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weaker law would be more appropriate, emphasizing the viability of the U.K. 
Modern Slavery Act.154 The law should ultimately have a pedagogical focus by 
encouraging companies to comply rather than punishing them with civil 
penalties for violations.155 Furthermore, the law should aim to include 
companies that may not be large enough to be covered under the current law but 
operate in countries notorious for human rights abuses.156 Detractors insist that 
a more practical approach—focusing on encouraging companies to be 
responsible rather than forcing them—will avert the legal uncertainty created by 
this law and avoid encumbering companies with burdensome requirements.157 
On the other hand, supporters hail the French law as the first bold step 
forward in encouraging companies to ensure that their operations are not 
involved in human rights violations and are not putting workers at risk.158 They 
view the law not as a burden on companies, but as an advantage for them. In the 
modern world, companies are uniquely poised to defend human rights and work 
in favor of the common good.159 Companies not only can appease the public’s 
growing demand for satisfactory treatment of workers abroad, but they can also 
appeal to legislators in the countries in which they operate to provide sufficient 
protection for workers.160 Furthermore, by preventing risks of harm, companies 
are more respected and become more profitable.161 Self-regulation is not a viable 
solution, particularly in light of the recent financial crisis as a result of financial 
self-regulation.162 In addition, supporters argue that the law is practical in its 
minimalist application.163 The scope is limited, applying to only approximately 
100 companies.164 Those companies falling under the scope of the law are 
required to implement only reasonable measures to identify risks to human 
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rights, fundamental liberties, health, and security of persons.165 Through this 
law, “France can lead the way in Europe” by legislating CSR.166 
V.  POSSIBILITIES FOR CSR IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
As CSR continues to grow in importance in the minds of consumers and 
companies around the world, the creation of laws implementing CSR is likely to 
occur. Information about human rights and worker abuses is more readily 
available than ever before, and consumers have taken notice.167 Furthermore, 
self-regulation, while successful to some extent, is often considered insufficient 
in light of severe violations that come to the public’s attention. Therefore, a 
consideration of the current means of holding companies accountable for the 
actions of their foreign contractors is relevant. The goal in this review is to 
determine which method will be most effective to ensure that foreign workers 
do not suffer egregious violations of their rights and their safety while making 
products for American companies. 
VI.  EXISTING POSSIBILITIES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
A. Self-Regulation 
The existing legal structure for CSR in the United States in regards to 
workers’ rights and worker safety at foreign contractors’ workplaces relies 
primarily on self-regulation of companies. As the public has increasingly 
demonstrated support for CSR, companies have worked with their contractors 
to ensure that workers are treated better.168 Self-regulation gives companies the 
latitude to decide how to implement CSR and to spend an amount that the 
company can afford in terms of money and lost competitivity. However, self-
regulation relies largely on the arbitrary will of the public and the good will of 
companies. Media stories about workers’ rights and safety violations often 
prompt the public to push companies for CSR.169 This leads to an unequal 
protection of workers and an unequal punishment of companies that remain 
deliberately indifferent to unsafe working conditions and rights violations. 
While self-regulation is not entirely without merit, relying on companies to 
police themselves is not adequate to protect workers abroad. 
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B. Extraterritorial Application of FLSA and OSHA 
The trend of external application of American laws has been a recent 
concern of the Supreme Court.170 While Congress does have the power to make 
American laws apply extraterritorially, the Court’s determination of 
extraterritoriality is dependent on the statutory construction.171 The Court begins 
its analysis with a presumption against extraterritoriality.172 To rebut the 
presumption, the statute in question must give a clear indication of its 
extraterritorial application.173 
Congress can pass or amend a law to apply extraterritorially. After the 
Supreme Court found that Title VII did not rebut the presumption against 
territorial application, Congress amended Title VII to cover American citizens 
who are employed abroad.174 In addition, Congress designed the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act175 to apply to bribes paid abroad by companies doing 
business in the United States.176 These examples demonstrate the ways in which 
American laws can be extended to actions abroad. 
Currently, the primary American laws that protect workers—the FLSA and 
OSHA—largely do not apply extraterritorially.177 Should Congress add an 
extraterritorial provision to these laws, extending these protections to Americans 
and workers for American companies abroad, many workers would be afforded 
worker safety protections. However, such an amendment is not only unlikely, 
but probably infeasible. First, because the violations occur abroad, frequent trials 
in the United States are impractical and expensive. Second, both the FLSA and 
OSHA have investigatory bodies that monitor compliance.178 To extend the 
review of those investigatory bodies abroad would be prohibitively expensive 
for the federal government. Furthermore, such an amendment would not address 
the role of contractors in the modern world. In fact, companies likely would rely 
more on contractors to avoid the extra expense of compliance. The 
extraterritorial application of the FLSA and OSHA would not only be highly 
unlikely, but would not effectively protect workers abroad. 
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C. Alien Tort Statute 
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
was passed by Congress in 1789.179 The ATS stipulates: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”180 
Between 1789 and 1980, the ATS was used on three occasions.181 In the 1980 
case Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the Second Circuit resurrected the ATS to find 
jurisdiction in federal courts over acts of torture that had taken place in Paraguay, 
under the analysis that torture qualified as a “violation of the law of nations.”182 
Since Filártiga, plaintiffs have been using the ATS to bring human rights 
violations abroad under the purview of American federal courts. In 2004, the 
Supreme Court ensured that the scope of the ATS remained narrow in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain by holding that only ATS claims that violate “a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world” and are “defined with a 
specificity” sufficiently similar to those already delineated (“violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”).183 Therefore, 
the ATS application is limited to specific violations of customary international 
law.184 
Dozens of lawsuits have been pursued under the auspices of the ATS against 
corporate defendants.185 Courts have held that corporations can be liable for 
violations of customary international law under the ATS.186 However, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the use of the ATS in light of complaints by foreign 
governments about the ATS application overseas and increased concern over 
judicial interference in foreign policy.187 The Supreme Court significantly 
changed the ATS landscape in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In Kiobel, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the subsidiary of Shell had used the Nigerian 
government to violently put down protests against the company.188 The Second 
Circuit had dismissed the case, holding—contrary to other circuits—that the law 
of nations did not encompass corporate liability.189 The issue of corporate 
liability was argued before the Supreme Court; however, the Supreme Court then 
ordered the case to be reargued in the next term on the issue of 
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extraterritoriality.190 In its Kiobel decision published in 2013, the Supreme Court 
held that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially.191 
While the Kiobel holding narrows the scope of ATS lawsuits, the decision 
left an opening for actions that “touch and concern” the United States.192 The 
case law interpreting the “touch and concern” test is not yet entirely clear. 
However, courts so far generally have found that the action has sufficient nexus 
with the United States where “it occurred domestically, was planned or directed 
domestically, or because it was directed at the United States.”193 ATS claims for 
actions that occur abroad perpetrated by foreigners against foreign victims—the 
so-called “foreign-cubed” cases—have been dismissed.194  
The Kiobel decision reflects the Supreme Court’s growing concern 
regarding the extraterritoriality of American legislation. As other countries have 
complained about American “judicial imperialism,” the Supreme Court has 
responded by leaving the issue in the hands of Congress.195 Therefore, Congress 
can restore extraterritoriality to the ATS by amending the statute. The actions of 
contractors likely are among the “foreign-cubed” cases, excluded from current 
post-Kiobel ATS jurisdiction. The contractor layer insulates American 
companies from liability. Even if Congress were to expand ATS jurisdiction, 
worker rights and worker safety violations currently are not covered under the 
ATS.196 The ATS establishes jurisdiction of federal courts for violations of 
customary international law, which is determined by widespread state practice 
and case precedent.197 In Flomo v. Firestone National Rubber Co., the Seventh 
Circuit held that child labor was not a violation of customary international 
law.198 The prohibition on child labor, as well as other workers’ rights 
recognized in the United States, have not achieved the same widespread 
recognition as other principles recognized under the ATS, such as the prohibition 
against torture.199 However, workers’ rights are not precluded from joining the 
ranks of customary international law in the future. The ATS currently cannot be 
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used to find liability of American companies for the violation of workers’ rights 
by their foreign contractors. 
D. Liability Under State Common Law 
In some states, American companies can potentially be found liable for 
violations of workers’ rights and worker safety. Although, as a general rule, 
companies that employ contractors are not liable for the negligence of their 
contractors, tort law has provided narrow exceptions.200 One such exception is 
that employers can be liable for negligently selecting or hiring careless, reckless, 
or incompetent independent contractors.201 Courts have found employers liable 
for their contractors’ negligence where the employer knew or could have 
inferred that the contractor was careless, reckless, or incompetent.202 Likewise, 
courts have found employers liable for failing to use due care in selecting an 
independent contractor.203 In particular, larger companies that regularly employ 
independent contractors generally have a greater responsibility to ensure the 
competency of their independent contractors.204 If the independent contractor 
has a reputation for carelessness, recklessness, or incompetence, the employers 
are also more likely to be found liable for negligence in selecting them.205 In 
order to establish the employer’s negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the 
employer knew or should have known that the independent contractor was 
careless, reckless, or incompetent.206 This can be proven through incidents of 
prior negligence of the contractor.207 The plaintiff also must establish that a 
relationship between the employer and contractor existed and that the 
employer’s negligence in selecting the contractor was the proximate cause of the 
injury.208 In some states, employees of a contractor can sue the company that 
employs the contractor for injury caused to the employees from the contractor’s 
negligence.209 
The “negligent hiring” exception to the rule that employers are not liable for 
the negligence of their contractors likely can apply to foreign contractors. 
American companies that are aware of a contractor’s or potential contractor’s 
track record for negligence in the workplace and in the community can be held 
accountable for negligently selecting the contractor. Victims of the negligence—
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whether workers or other injured parties—will need to prove not only the 
American employer’s knowledge of the negligence, but also the employer-
contractor relationship and the employer’s selection as the proximate cause of 
the injury.210 The concern of applying state common law extraterritorially can 
be avoided where the decision to hire the contractor occurs in the United States.  
Victims can use the “negligent hiring” exception to create a negligence chain 
between American companies and their foreign contractors. However, this 
exception applies narrowly. The injury must be caused by negligence—rather 
than a mere violation of workers’ rights—and, therefore, will likely apply only 
to the most egregious cases.211 Furthermore, plaintiffs probably will struggle to 
prove that the American companies knew of the contractor’s repeated 
negligence. The introduction of this type of lawsuit can also lead to avoidance 
tactics by American companies. If liability can be established, companies will 
probably try to maintain plausible deniability regarding the negligence of 
contractors by adding further layers of contractors. Despite this potential bad 
outcome, the “negligent hiring” exception can provide an avenue for victims to 
receive recognition and compensation for the American companies’ 
irresponsible use of negligent contractors. 
VII.  POTENTIAL CHANGES FOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Supply Chain Check Plans 
Statutes that require companies to review their supply chains in order to 
legislate CSR are a popular method. California, the United Kingdom, and France 
have each instituted some measure of supply chain review.212 In California and 
the United Kingdom, companies are required to publish reports of their efforts 
to ensure there is no slavery or human trafficking in their supply chains.213 While 
these laws demonstrate some measure of enforced CSR, they are fairly weak. 
Companies to which the laws apply have no other obligations than to report what 
actions they take in regards to the narrow scope of slavery and human 
trafficking. These laws do not force the companies to take specific measures but 
instead rely on transparency to empower the public to exert pressure on 
offending companies. Therefore, the effect of the laws likely is not significant. 
Because the information is posted on the companies’ websites, the information 
is often removed from the customers at the time of the purchase. This distance 
between transparency and the customer likely weakens the power of the public 
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in encouraging companies to act responsibly. Although these methods of supply 
chain checks recognize companies’ responsibility in the whole of their 
operations, these methods rely on very motivated customers to pressure 
companies. However, the simplicity of the laws has its advantages; the laws 
utilize the will of the people—the driving force behind the development of 
CSR—rather than costly legal obligations to improve companies’ dedication to 
CSR. 
The French legislature has envisioned a more authoritative law requiring 
companies of a certain size to develop and implement “vigilance plans” that 
prevent human rights violations and risks to worker safety.214 In addition, in the 
event of the occurrence of a harm, companies may be required to compensate 
for the harm. The vigilance plan law, although it applies to few companies, is 
relatively burdensome. Companies will have to not only create a plan to ensure 
that subsidiaries and contractors do not cause harm, but also implement that plan 
among the relevant foreign subsidiaries and contractors. This requirement is a 
significant leap in legislating CSR. This French version of a supply chain check 
is more robust. The dangers of this fervent dedication to instilling CSR 
principles in the law are the uncertainty surrounding its requirements and 
enforcement, as well as the greater expense and potentially reduced 
competitivity forced on companies. 
B. CSR Index and Product Labeling 
Denmark has implemented a system to measure each company’s dedication 
to CSR. The system creates an index to measure such dedication and rewards 
companies at a minimum level with the ability to market their CSR dedication 
to the public.215 The index measures not only the company’s internal social 
responsibility, but also that of its suppliers.216 This system creates an incentive 
for companies to internalize CSR principles. The public’s buying power is the 
impetus for companies to gravitate toward improving their standards on social 
responsibility. When buying products, people can choose to favor products that 
have achieved the S-label, certifying the socially-responsible development of the 
product. The certification is granted only if it is certified by an independent 
auditor.217 This indexing and product labeling system provides an easily 
recognizable symbol that the public can incorporate into their daily buying 
habits. The ease of this system likely boosts the power of consumers. However, 
companies are only incentivized to be more socially responsible and are not 
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punished for their failures to ensure that they are responsible at every step in 
their operations. While the social index and product labeling is a simple yet 
important step toward legislating CSR, its effects are limited by its simplicity. 
C. Obligatory CSR Officers 
India has taken a unique approach to legislating CSR by obligating 
companies to create a CSR committee with at least three directors who develop 
CSR policies for the company and ensure that at least two percent of the 
company’s net profits are devoted to these policies.218 This law is one of the 
strongest positive obligations placed on companies by statutes. Companies are 
required to spend money creating and implementing CSR programs.219 
Importantly, this law is symbolic of the global development of CSR. The 
government has recognized a need for companies to consider CSR in their 
business practices. The law also gives companies the latitude to decide how to 
introduce CSR within their companies, rather than forcing external methods 
upon them.220 However, the independence of companies to decide their own 
standards can result in effective avoidance of the law’s purpose. Companies are 
essentially their own oversight. Therefore, they do not have to vigorously pursue 
their CSR policies. Although the two percent spending requirement will help to 
ensure that companies genuinely try to implement CSR policies, companies are 
free to focus on the issues that are most beneficial financially rather than 
socially.221 Despite the margin of discretion for companies, the spending 
requirement is a significant imposition. For some companies, two percent of net 
profits equates to a large dollar value, which may be excessive to achieve their 
CSR goals. 
The Indian law does not focus on CSR demands on subsidiary and contractor 
behavior. This law can be bolstered to encourage companies in their CSR 
policies to address the rights and safety of workers employed by subsidiaries and 
contractors abroad. However, the lack of independent oversight and promotion 
of the company’s discretion indicate that a company may not have much impetus 
to investigate its operations overseas. Furthermore, such investigation and 
implementation of CSR policies abroad is likely expensive and could decrease 
their profit margins. On the other hand, this law can encourage companies to 
take the time and spend the money on CSR throughout the company. The law 
insists that companies recognize and internalize CSR. Despite its weaknesses, 
this law also has the potential to introduce companies to CSR and encourage 
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them to develop their own techniques, tailored to their businesses, to integrate 
CSR into their business practices, and even to those of their foreign contractors. 
D. Direct Liability 
The French legislature introduced the concept of compensation for harms 
occurring abroad as a result of the company’s failure to adequately police its 
subsidiaries and contractors.222 However, the circumstances and scope of this 
compensation are not clear. The French law contemplates liability for 
companies.223 A statute that establishes liability for harm to workers caused by 
foreign contractors is the strongest incentive for American companies to 
investigate and prevent such harms. However, such a statute is in many ways 
impractical. First, trials would need to take place in the United States, far away 
from the location where the harm occurred. The trials would not only be very 
expensive but also likely deficient in evidence. Second, the statutory liability 
would create a heavy burden on companies that use foreign contractors. They do 
not have significant control over the contractor’s operations, and poor worker 
safety is often commonplace in those countries. Third, a statute demanding 
direct liability is contrary to the general rule that principals are not liable for the 
negligence of their independent contractors. Furthermore, contractors often have 
several customers, and it would be difficult to determine the company’s level of 
liability in a particular incident. Although such a statute would heavily 
encourage companies to institute measures to ensure that their foreign 
contractors respect the rights and safety of their workers, the statute would be 
very unpopular and likely unworkable.  
VIII.  THE OPTIMAL METHOD FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The French law on the duty of care of parent companies forges a new path 
in legislating CSR. Significantly, the law creates the concept of a “vigilance 
plan,” which includes delineation of risks to workers, measures to prevent 
harms, and assessments of subsidiaries and subcontractors.224 Such a vigilance 
plan legislation would be beneficial in the United States. In fact, California has 
already implemented a similar law requiring companies to report the ways in 
 
 222. See French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: Frequently Asked Questions, EUR. 
COALITION FOR CORP. JUST. (Feb. 23, 2017), http://corporatejustice.org/documents/publications/ 
french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y82X-FX7D]. 
 223. See id.; Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères 
et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 Law About the Duty of 
Due Diligence of Parent Companies and Main Contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÈPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017 (Fr.), 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/3/27/2017-399/jo/texte [https://perma.cc/J4PQ-S64P], 
translated in EUR. COALITION FOR CORP. JUST., http://corporatejustice.org/duty-of-vigilance-bill-
en-.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSM4-SZNG]. 
 224. See id. at 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FOREIGN CONTRACTORS 535 
which they act to prevent slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains.225 
However, a wider scope will better accomplish the goal to hold companies 
accountable for workers’ rights violations that occur in the production and 
acquisition of their products.  
Because OSHA and the FLSA adequately protect American workers, the 
American vigilance plan law need only require that the plans address the 
operations of the company, subsidiaries, and contractors outside the United 
States. Like the French “vigilance plan,” the law should demand that the 
vigilance plans include: a listing of the risks, analyzed and ranked, to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, physical safety of workers, and the 
environment; procedures for the regular assessments of company, subsidiary, 
and contractor operations; elucidated actions to mitigate risks or prevent serious 
harm; alert system to notify the company of the existence of risks; and a 
monitoring process to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of the plan. In 
addition, vigilance plans should be accompanied by a reporting component. 
Companies should be required to report worker safety incidents that occur in the 
company, its subsidiaries, and its contractors. This law should apply only to 
larger companies headquartered in the United States. In addition, these 
companies should be obligated to file their plans with the Department of Labor 
and also make them public on their websites. The advantages of the vigilance 
plan are that companies are forced to investigate their supply chains for worker 
safety and that the public can use their buying power to encourage companies to 
better protect workers. Furthermore, these reports can be used by potential 
plaintiffs who can sue American companies under a theory of negligent selection 
and hiring. 
The most significant concern with the effectiveness of implementing 
vigilance plan legislation is enforcement. Companies can falsify reporting data. 
To combat this, a provision can be added requiring the vigilance plan to be 
checked by an independent auditor, at the expense of the company. Similar to 
the French law, any interested party should be able to bring an action against a 
company to which this law applies if the company has failed to file and publish 
a vigilance plan. The court can issue an injunction against the company. In 
addition, the effect of the law’s vigilance plans and reporting requirements can 
be amplified with a certification system based on best worker safety records, 
similar to the Danish Social Index. 
While the French law’s vigilance plan can be adapted for the American legal 
context, the concept of liability and compensation for harm caused by failure to 
implement the vigilance plan is incompatible. In the context of American agency 
law, companies are not typically responsible for the negligence and fraud of their 
independent contractors.226 Therefore, such liability would be contrary to 
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existing American legal principles. However, the requirement of vigilance plans 
will encourage not only transparency but also compliance with better workers’ 
rights and safety standards in companies’ operations. Furthermore, such a law 
reflects the growing public support for CSR, particularly in corporate operations 
and supply chains abroad. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though workers’ rights and worker safety legislation was first 
implemented in the United States over a century ago, many products sold to 
American consumers are created in violation of the principles set forth in those 
laws. American companies have been able to reduce production costs by moving 
their manufacturing operations abroad. Many developing economies and 
impoverished people have benefited from the income from these job 
opportunities, but workers still suffer from poor working conditions. However, 
companies have also been able to avoid the costs of providing adequate worker 
protections by relying on foreign contractors to manufacture their products. 
Concern for the welfare of these foreign workers is growing around the world, 
as evidenced in the rise of CSR and the new French legislation. While self-
regulation is important, legislation will ensure that the public can make informed 
consumer decisions. By demanding that American companies be responsible for 
the safety of the people manufacturing their products, the concern for worker 
safety and the implementation of measures to protect them will continue to 
spread around the world. 
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